It seems like I win when I lose
Published: Sun, 10/26/25
Sport fighting does develop fitness and basic coordination. Team sports may cultivate a degree of leadership and colaboration. However, the best advice I have ever seen regarding real combat is that: ‘If you find yourself in a fair fight, then you are guilty of a lack of planning’. When you fight a war, you plan to win, or do not fight it. What if the enemy is much larger and more powerful than you? If you are in a position of weakness, and you still believe that you must fight, then you must ensure that your enemy’s power is the reason for his defeat. Such conflict is known as ‘asemmetric warfare’ and it is not a new idea. In the 3rd century BCE King Pyrrhus of Epirius won two battles against the Romans at such a high cost in casualties that it nearly destroyed his kingdom. This episode is still remembered in the expression; ‘Phyrrhic victory’, a success which comes at such a high cost that avoiding the conflict, or even
defeat, might have been preferable.
The ongoing conflict in Gaza is an almost textbook case of asymmetric warfare and I would like to share some of the lessons I have noticed.
Gaza was not physically occupied by the Israeli military but it was contained and controlled from land, sea, and air to the point where the territory was effectively a concentration camp, or certainly a ghetto, and its inhabitants were more or less prisoners. The political situation was complicated in that it suited the Israeli government to have an administration, Hammas, which was in opposition to the Palestinian Authority which manages the West Bank on behalf of the Israelis. This way it could be claimed that the Palestinians were so divided that they could never manage a single state of their own and needed to be either occupied, as in the West Bank, or securely confined to a ghetto as in Gazza. Meanwhile the Israelis could continue their project of creating the ‘Greater Israel’. This may be a simplification of a complex process but essentially it was the situation up until September 2023.
Three other factors need to be noted:
Firstly, the USA and Israel were working on the ‘Abraham Accords’ which was an agreement to ‘normalise’ relations between Israel and Middle Eastern states, notably Saudi Arabia with no consideration for the future of the Palestinians, and certainly no progress towards a ‘Two State Solution’.
Secondly, Benjamin Netanyahu has major corruption charges against him which he will one day have to answer in court. It is widely believed that it is only Netanyahu’s status as Prime minister that is keeping him out of prison. Prior to October 2023 there were attempts to change the constitution to give the government more power over judges and thus protect corrupt politicians from prosecution. Such was the resentment among the Israeli public against these moves that the country seemed to be on the verge of civil war. Netanyahu’s days in office, and thus out of prison seemed to be numbered. Becoming a ‘war leader’ conveniently restored his authority.
Thirdly, the Hamas Leader,Yahya Sinwar. seems to have decided that something needed to be done to get attention for the Palestinian cause. A raid was planned that would get the attention of the world. Either, the Israelis would treat the Palestinans with more respect following a military action, or (more likely) the IDF would massively over react which would draw the world’s attention to the plight of the Palestinians.
As far as I can work out from publicly available sources of information and informed commentary both sides attempted to create a Phyrrhic victory for the other side and it is still not clear who won the worst of their situation, history will be the judge.
It seems that the Hamas plan was to break out of Gaza and attack the Israeli military bases which contain Gaza from behind the border fence. Prisoners would also be taken to exchange for the thousands of Palestinians held by the Israelis. It should be noted that Kibbutz settlements are armed outposts with small garrisons of IDF troops stationed in each one, so a Kibbutz is a legitimate military target.
The expectation would have been that the IDF would have been ready for such an event and reinforcements would would rapidly be deployed to drive the militants back into Gaza. Hamas openly rehearsed the operation for many weeks in advance under the surveillance of the IDF and the plan had been circulating for a long time. There could be little expectation of surprise and massive Palestinian casualties among the militants taking part must have been expected If prisoners were successfully taken then retaliation would be moderated, at least until exchanges had taken place, and the world would once again be discussing the Palestinian cause. (This is a simplification of Scott Ritter’s excellent analysis of the event, please see link below.)
So, what did happen? The interesting question is whether or not Benjamin Netanyhu knew the attack was coming and decided to use the situation to his own advantage. There has been no proper investigation by the Israelis into what happened on October the 7th 2023. However, the following observations can be made:
Even though IDF observers had been reporting the build up to the attack for weeks beforehand their concerns were actively suppressed. Forces were moved from the general area to the West Bank, and even the Kibbutz settlements were stripped of their weapons and IDF personnel. When the attack did start it is widely reported that there was effectively a ‘stand down’ for several hours before a serious response was mounted. When units did respond the ‘Hannibal directive’ was applied to minimise the number of prisoners taken by Hamas and around half the 1200 deaths were actually caused by Israeli fire. You could put the delayed Israeli response down to bad luck and incompetence. However, such carelessness would be uncharacteristic of the IDF and Netanyhu has secured his position as a ‘wartime leader’ postponing for a while his likely jail sentence. There was a clear intention to ethnically cleanse Gaza of its inhabitants immediately
following the attack, which was only frustrated by a combination of the Gazans’ refusal to leave and the Egyptian reluctance to open the border into the Sinai desert.
So, whose victory is the most Phyrric? Gaza has been largely destroyed and the true casualty count may never be properly known. Militarily the IDF has the power to kill and destroy in Gaza as it wishes. On the other hand Israel’s most potent weapon for the past 80 has been its control over the international narrative that Israel only uses violence to defend itself. Now, this perception is crumbling by the day as the world witnesses a genocidal revenge orgy. It will be very interesting to see what happens at the next election cycle in Western countries and the situation seems to be moving fast, please see the C J Werleman below
What can we learn from such episodes? When you take aggressive action, however justified it might seem to be at the time, be very careful. If you believe that you are being provoked or ill treated in some way think twice before you initiate a chain of events which lands you in a world of trouble. A ‘fair fight’ is one thing, the really clever enemy will set you up to ‘win’ at a cost you can’t afford.
Regards
Graham
PS Please check out Scott Ritter’s analysis of the tragic events of two years ago https://scottritter.substack.com/p/the-most-successful-military-raid
Why have American Christians suddenly turned on Israel? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PBNSwsw1cec
PPS I will be arranging dates for a course in the Spring and Stavcamp 2026 in time for the next Newsletter. In the meantime here is a short video from the 2015 Stavcamp https://app.screencast.com/5SRx1rwpUbyHR
Graham Butcher
21 Beaver Road
Beverley East Yorkshire HU17 0QN
UNITED KINGDOM
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